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This action was brought under the Michigan Death Act' by the ad-
ministrator of a 14 year old boy, who was killed by an automobile driven
by defendant. The jury found the defendant negligent and made an
award of $14,000 plus $979.50 for funeral and burial expenses. The trial
court ordered a new trial unless remittitur of $6,500 were filed.2 The
Michigan Supreme Court reversed,3 rejected the child-labor theory as
the sole measure of pecuniary loss, and held that damages for a child's
wrongful death should be based upon "the pecuniary value of the life"4
and that the judgment was not excessive. The court declared that in
order to ascertain this value,
we must consider the expenses of birth, of food, of clothing, of
medicines, of instruction, of nurture and shelter . . . .The value
of mutual society and protection, in a word, companionship ....
Finally if, in some unusual situation, there is in truth .. . a wage-
profit capability in the infant . .. the loss of such expectation
should not be disregarded . .. .5
At common law neither a decedent's representative nor the members
of his family had a cause of action for the loss caused by his death
through a wrongful act.6 This note concerns statutory remedies for wrongful
death,7 patterned after the English Lord Campbell's Act,8 which have
been enacted in every state.9 In interpreting "pecuniary loss," the majority
of American jurisdictions hold that the basic measure of recovery for death
is the loss by the beneficiaries of the support and contributions which
decedent probably would have contributed to them during the remainder
of his life expectancy.' 0 In others, however, the basic measure of recovery
1 Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.581-.583 (1948).
2 The trial court based its order upon the rule that under the death act, the
measure of the pecuniary loss suffered through the death of a minor is the estimated
earnings and services of the child prior to his reaching majority minus the cost
of his rearing. Coutney v. Apple, 345 Mich. 223, 76 N.W.2d 80 (1956); Hurst
v. Detroit City Ry., 84 Mich. 539, 48 N.W. 44 (1891).
3 Three justices of the eight justice court dissented in this opinion. Since the last
decision on the question presented in the instant case, the court's membership has
partially changed.
4 Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118, at 122 (1960).
5 Ibid.
6 Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
7 Wrongful death actions are to be distinguished from survivorship actions which
preserve the decedent's cause of action.
8 Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
9 Prosser, Torts § 105 (2d ed. 1955).
10 Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry., 116 Cal. 156, 47 Pac. 1019 (1897); Rouse v.
Detroit Elec. Ry., 128 Mich. 149, 87 N.W. 68 (1901); Fisher v. Trester, 119 Neb.
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for wrongful death is the loss to the decedent's estate, and in these juris-
dictions three formulae for recovery are found. A few courts have held
that the recovery should be that amount which decedent probably would
have earned had he remained alive minus his own living expenses.11 Others
declare the recovery to be the present worth of the amount decedent would
have likely saved during the rest of his life expectancy. 2 Finally, Georgia
and Kentucky declare the present worth of gross earnings which decedent
would have earned, without deduction for any expenses whatever, to be
the measure of recovery. 13
Recovery under the death acts has been generally limited to loss of
pecuniary benefits,14 that is, the measure of recovery is generally the value
of support, services, and contributions which the beneficiary might have
expected to receive had death not intervened. This principle has been ap-
plied in cases of wrongful death of minor children, and heretofore two meas-
ures of recovery have emerged from the opinions. The child-labor measure-
recognized in Michigan prior to the instant case-allows recovery of the
value of the probable earnings and services of the child prior to his reach-
ing majority minus the cost of his rearing.15 However, other courts permit
recovery of the present value of any services or contributions which the
child might be expected to render after majority in addition to the net
value of services during minority.16 The first rule is labelled arbitrary be-
cause exclusion of the value of aid after majority precludes consideration
529, 229 N.W. 901 (1930); Greer v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 33 Ohio App. 539, 169 N.E.
709 (1927); Glasco v. Green, 273 Pa. 353, 117 Atl. 79 (1922).
11 Louisville & N. Ry. v. Garnett, 129 Miss. 795, 93 So. 241 (1922); Pittman
v. Merriman, 80 N.H. 295, 117 Adt. 18 (1922); Gurley v. Southern Power Co., 172
N.C. 690, 90 S.E. 943 (1916).
12 Arizona Binghampton Copper Co. v. Dickson, 22 Ariz. 163, 195 Pac. 538
(1921); Florida E. Coast R.R. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914); Haugh v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 169 Iowa 224, 149 N.W. 885 (1914).
13 Michael v. Western & Adt. R.R., 175 Ga. 1, 165 S.E. 37 (1932); Williams v.
McCranie, 27 Ga. App. 693, 109 S.E. 699 (1921); Lexington Util. Co. v. Parker,
166 Ky. 81, 178 S.W. 1173 (1915).
14 Louisville & N. Ry. v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 328, 182 S.W.2d 447 (1944); Karr
v. Sixt, 146 Ohio St. 527, 67 N.E.2d 331 (1946); Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523,
152 Atl. 549 (1930); Tuffy v. Sioux City Transit Co., 69 S.D. 368, 10 N.W.2d 767
(1943).
15 McCormick, Damages § 101 (1935). This rule has also been accepted in
Arkansas, District of Columbia, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington.
16 McCormick, Damages § 101 (1935). This is said to be the rule in Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. The leading case for this view
is Bond v. United R.R., 159 Cal. 270, 113 Pac. 366 (1911). The Ohio rule seems
to follow this view. However, in Immel v. Richards, 154 Ohio St. 52, 93 N.E.2d
474 (1950), the court said there is no exact rule regarding the amount of damages,
and the factors for consideration are age, sex, physical and mental condition of the
child and the position in life, occupation, physical and economic conditions of the
parents.
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of the only pecuniary benefit which the parents could expect.17 Courts have
generally held that parents are not permitted to recover for the loss of a
minor child's companionship.' 8 However, such loss has been compensated
for in a minority of jurisdictions, 9 but with misgivings.2 0
In modifying its prior position, the Michigan Supreme Court discussed
the change in social conditions since the child-labor measure was first
adopted. This concept of value is a remnant of an era when large numbers
of children worked in mills and mines.2 ' Application of this rule is illustrated
in Courtney v. Apple22 where the Michigan Supreme Court in 1956 held a
verdict of $700, the amount of funeral and burial expenses, sufficient to
compensate the parents of a three-year-old boy killed by defendant's negli-
gently driven automobile. The court explained that it was quite possible for
the jury to find that the cost of raising the child would exceed his probable
contributions. Justice Smith, who wrote the majority opinion in the instant
case, dissented and pointed out that had the defendant killed a bull on the
highway, the owner could recover its actual value. However, the parents of
this child were not entitled to any damages whatever under the child-labor
measure of recovery.
Certainly the child-labor standard is obsolete unless the value of a
child is limited to its actual money profit to its "beneficiaries." The Mich-
igan court has thus discarded a callous standard which is not in accord with
present social values and one finds it difficult to disagree. The question
remains as to whether the new elements of recovery are satisfactory.
The phrase "the pecuniary value of the life" is ambiguous, but the
17 McCormick, Damages § 101 (1935).
I8 East St. Louis Elec. St. Ry. v. Burns, 77 Il. App. 529 (1898); Louisville NA.
& C. Ry. v. Rush, 127 Ind. 545, 26 N.E. 1010 (1890); Costello v. Buffalo General
Elec. Co., 183 App. Div. 48, 170 N.Y. Supp. 1006 (1918); Kennedy v. Byers, 107
Ohio St. 90, 140 N.E. 630 (1923); Kalsow v. Grob, 61 N.D. 119, 237 N.W. 848 (1931).
19 Bond v. United R.R., supra note 16; Roby v. Kansas City So. Ry., 130 La.
896, 58 So. 701 (1912); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Miller, 153 Miss. 741, 121 So. 482 (1929);
Beaman v. Martha Washington Mining Co., 23 Utah 139, 63 Pac. 631 (1901).
20 The California Supreme Court in the case of Bond v. United R.R., supra note
16, at 285, 113 Pac. 373, although allowing plaintiff to recover for loss of companion-
ship, states the main objection to such recovery: "It is evident to us, however,
from the cases that have come before us, that it often leads to extravagant verdicts
in which the jury, in fact, allow a supposed compensation for sad emotions and injured
feelings, instead of confining their verdict to the actual pecuniary loss."
21 Wycko v. Gnodtke, supra note 4. The court explained that the rule originated
in an era when "Loss meant only money loss, and money loss from death of a child
meant only his lost wages. All else was imaginary. The only reality was the King's
shilling. That this barbarous concept of the pecuniary loss to a parent from the death
of his child should control our decisions today is a reproach to justice. We are still
turning, actually, for guidance in decision, to 'one of the darkest chapters in the history
of childhood.' . . . In most areas the development of the law has paralleled the en-
lightened conscience of our people." 105 N.W.2d 121. See also Beall, "Wrongful
Death and Survivorship," N.A.C.C..-6th Circuit Regional Meeting and Seminar
Report § 3.3 (1958).
22 Courtney v. Apple, supra note 2.
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court in the instant case explained the elements which are to make up
this value. The court retained the child-labor test by specifying that if the
child is in fact a wage-earner or there is a reasonable expectation that he
would be such, the excess of his wages over the cost of his keep should be
included in the damages. However, by compensating the parents for past
expenditures for food, shelter, and clothing, and the value of companionship,
the court has substantially enlarged the measure of recovery. By including
the costs of rearing a child, the court has permitted a new element of re-
covery to compensate parents for their actual expenses in raising the child.
These tangible costs of raising a child are ascertainable,2 3 and their inclu-
sion seems justified. The value of companionship, however, is not easily
determinable and the inclusion of this element may well lead to excessive
verdicts by juries influenced by parent's mental anguish.2 4 Excessive ver-
dicts, however, are not a new problem for the courts and this court must
be commended for its modification of an archaic measure of damages.
23 See Dublin & Lotka, The Money Value of a Man 44 (1946).
24 The court emphasized that the recovery is not to include sorrow and anguish
suffered by the parents because such recovery is forbidden by the death act. How-
ever, juries are likely to be affected by parental suffering when determining the value
of companionship.

